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ABSTRACT 
It is argued that the main cause of the recent corporate failure was that corporations engaged in excessive risk 
taking. The board of directors is responsible for the companies’ risk management policies. This research 
examined how board characteristics predict risk taking propensity when firm size and industry were controlled. 
The study also examined the moderating effect of firm performance on board structure -risk taking relationship. 
Moreover, the study was guided by agency theory which postulates principal-agent conflict in decision making. 
The study employed explanatory research design. The research utilized secondary data derived from document 
analysis mainly from companies’ financial reports. The study included 38 companies listed throughout 2005-
2010. Both descriptive and inferential statistics were used. The data collected was presented in tables and graphs. 
Inferential statistics included correlation and moderated regression analysis. The findings revealed that board 
size had negative significant effect on risk taking (β=-.061, p<0.01), director independence had positive effect on 
risk taking (β=1.249, p<0.01) and CEO duality had no effect on risk taking (β=0.311, p>0.01). After moderation 
of the above variables using firm performance, board size and director independence had significant effect on 
risk taking; (β=0.025, p < 0.05), (β=0.309, p< 0.05) respectively whereas CEO duality has no effect on risk 
taking (β=0.092, p> 0.05).In conclusion, the study showed that board structure affects risk taking and that firm 
performance has a moderating effect.  Thus the study recommends that managers should emphasize on reducing 
board size and increasing director independence which can have strong impact on firm decisions and outcomes. 
Specifically, it can lead to undue risk taking, and such risk taking may significantly influence the firm’s 
performance. In addition level of performance when making such decision is a crucial factor that should be taken 
into account. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Much of the empirical findings on corporate governance, firm performance and risk taking in companies have 
confirmed that board engage in making decisions which either improve the value of a firm or become 
detrimental. Formation of  boards are mechanisms to oversee the conduct of the owner-manager and prevent 
them from endangering vested parties interest (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003).Decisions relating to company’s 
policies and strategic planning, their implementation and the appointment, dismissal and compensation of 
executives are ratified and determined by the board (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
Consistent with agency theory, the role of the board is significant in designing efficient corporate monitoring and 
ratification mechanisms which regulates activities done by management. With respect to reducing agency costs 
at the board level, boards of directors have three key decision rights which are monitoring, ratification, reward 
and punishment rights .They may even remove top managers from their positions and sanction them for their 
decisions. Such decisions according to the theory involve high risks taking or conservative implementation of 
strategies thus low risk taking. 
The monitoring role of the boards has been examined in several academic studies.  For example, the relationship 
between corporate performance and outside directorships was examined by Kaplan and Reishus (1990).  Cotter 
et al., (1997) studied the role of directors in takeover control of firms.  According to Stulz (1988), if a board 
relaxes the monitoring role, managerial discretion increases leading to implementation of conservative 
investment policies giving rise to low risk-taking hence sub optimal decisions thus poor performance. Poor 
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corporate decisions such as poor resource allocation according to Durnev et al., (2004) could lead to low level of 
informed risk arbitrage which ultimately leads to low productivity growth. 
 However, research indicates that risk taking propensity of decision makers depend on firm performance. This 
argument is supported by previous researches for example, Whetten (1987) and Cameron et al., (1987) argues 
that that poor performance and organizational decline can lead to increased secrecy and conservatism which 
reduces risk taking. On the contrary, March and Simon (1958) noted that poor performance drives organizations 
into problem-motivated search leading to pressure for change hence more  risks are taken. Moreover, past 
organizational success can also create illusions of invulnerability that make decision makers impervious to 
external change (Dutton & Duncan, 1987; Starbuck & Hedberg, 1977). Organizations with a history of success 
will resist fundamental change and the longer a period of success has lasted, the more time inertial forces will 
have had to develop and the more difficult it will be to initiate change in response to changes in environmental 
conditions (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). 
Bourgeois also wrote that the excess resources successful performance generates allow an organization to 
compete in its environment more boldly (1981; 35). Hambrick and Snow (1977) argued that successful 
organizations can better afford to attempt new strategies and new organizational arrangements, such as 
introducing new products and new markets or experimenting with new organizational structures. Although firm 
performance has been proven to affect decisions made, there are little empirical studies on the relationship 
between board structure and risk taking. In addition, the moderating role of firm performance on board structure-
risk taking link remains largely unexplored. This study attempted to determine the moderating role of firm 
performance on the relationship between board structure and risk taking.   
2.0 Literature Review 
2.1 CEO Duality and Corporate Risk Taking 
Agency theory argues that separation of CEO and chairman positions would provide greater transparency and 
accountability on firm decisions and information, which aims to improve shareholder trust and ultimately 
generate better corporate risk taking (Adams et al., 2005; Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994; Gillan, 2006; Kroll et 
al., 2008). Furthermore, Cadbury committee also (1992) proposes that the roles of chairman and CEO should be 
separated. 
HO1:  CEO duality has no effect on risk-taking in listed companies 
2.2 Board Size and Corporate Risk Taking 
This is considered to be a crucial characteristic of the board structure. Large boards could provide the diversity 
that would help companies to secure critical resources and reduce environmental uncertainties (Pfeffer, 1987; 
Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Goodstein et al., 1994) but Yermack (1996) said that coordination, communication and 
decision-making problems increasingly impede company risk taking when the number of directors increases. 
Thus, as an extra member is included in the board, a potential trade-off exists between diversity and 
coordination. Jensen (1993) appears to support Lipton and Lorsch (1992) who recommend a number of board 
members between seven and eight. However, board size recommendations tend to be industry-specific, since 
Adams and Mehran (2003) indicate that bank holding companies have board size significantly larger than those 
of manufacturing firms. 
HO2:   Board size has no effect on firm’s risk-taking in listed companies 
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2.3 Director Independence and Corporate Risk Taking 
Drawing from resource dependence theory, independent directors serve to coordinate organizational action, and 
provide external links (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Independent directors serve to reduce the incentives for 
opportunism by increasing the bilateral flow of information between exchange partners (Phan et al., 2003). Thus, 
resource dependence theory predicts that independent directors would lead to improved firm risk taking because 
they allow the firm access to productive resources, legitimacy and information (Mizruchi, 1996, Schoorman et 
al., 1981). In addition, the negative relation is also consistent with Cheng (2008) who argues that holding board 
size constant, independent directors might have more heterogeneous views than insider directors. These 
heterogeneous opinions are moderate board decisions and be associated with lower levels of risk. When we 
measure independence using the fraction of truly independent directors, we find that this proxy for independence 
is unrelated to total risk. This shows that the new measure of independence captures other aspects of the board 
relationship than the reported independence measure. 
HO3:  Director Independence has no effect on risk taking in listed Companies  
2.4 The Moderating Effect of Firm Performance on Board Structure and Risk Taking 
Scholars have produced equivocal results on the effects of performance on organizational action. Four arguments 
have emerged, two concerning the effect of poor performance and two effects of successful performance. The 
first general argument by Whetten (1987) argued that poor performance and organizational decline leads to 
increased secrecy and conservatism. This hypothesis is supported by Cameron (1987) who said that poor 
performance may restrict the number of sources of information consulted and alternatives considered in 
developing potential solutions, which in turn reduces change. Staw et al., (1981) explained that poor 
performance increase rigidity, centralization and formalization which hinder change and adaption. According to 
Singh (1986; 564), performance decline leads decision makers undertaking conservative rather than high risk 
decisions. Hed-berg (1981) and Dutton& Duncan (1987) added that poor performers lack the resources to even 
attempt change. 
On the contrary second argument explains that low performance acts as a catalyst to organizational adaption. 
Cyert and March (1963) and Kiesler and Sproull (1982) proved that decline in performance leads to corrective 
management action. The hypothesis was also supported by March and Simon (1958) who noted that poor 
performance drives organizations into problem -motivated search leading to pressure for change. The third 
argument was explained by Dutton & Duncan (1987) and Starbuck & Hedberg (1987) that past organizational 
success can create illusions of invulnerability that make decision makers impervious to external change. 
HO4a: Firm performance does not moderate the relationship between board size and firm risk  
HO4b: Firm performance does not moderate the relationship between director independence and firm risk 
taking  
HO4c: Firm performance does not moderate the relationship between CEO duality and firm risk taking 
3.0 Methodology and data 
We examined these issues by use of explanatory research design. We used 38 Listed Companies that have been 
consistent in the NSE between 2005 and 2010. We analyzed each company for 6 years i.e. (38*6=228 firm year 
observations).  
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We conducted the study using secondary sources which we achieved by analyzing the content of financial 
reports of 38 companies quoted in Kenya. We prepared document analysis guide to enable and guide collection 
of data on board composition of the selected listed companies and the extent of their risk taking.  
3.1 Measures of variables  
We assigned CEO duality the value 1; a situation where the CEO is not serving as the chairman of the board and 
assigned the value 0, (Shivdasani, 1999). The measure of board size which was also used in previous studies?
Yermack,1996; Mayers et al., 1997; Denis and Sarin,1999 , He and Sommer, 2006; Boon et al., 2007),was be the 
number of members on a board.   
We measured the director independence by the percentage of non- executive directors (outsiders) in a board. We 
also considered the ratio of outside to be the measure of board independence. 
We measured risk taking using standard deviation of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) where we employed 
it for the measure of firm risk as recommended by Baird and Thomas (1990). 
Zahra and Pearce (1989) suggest that greater scale of the firm may increase the amount of uncertainty and 
complexity in the firm‘s operation. Thus, previous empirical studies have suggested a positive relationship 
between firm size and firm risk (Graves, 1988; Hansen & Hill, 1991). We, therefore, controlled firm size which 
was measured as the log of total assets. In addition, given that past research has associated industry conditions 
with firm risk (e.g., Reed & Luffman, 1986; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1986), we controlled for industry types. We 
categorized the Industry by grouping similar firms into one industry and assigned a dummy variable. We 
categorized the firms into five industries namely Agricultural, Commercial and Services, Finance and 
Investment, Industrial and Allied and Alternative investment and we assigned dummy variables 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 
respectively. 
We used return on assets (ROA) which is an accounting-based measure for performance as it is a well-
understood operational measure (Grossman and Hoskisson, 1998;Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1995) primarily 
reflecting those areas under management’s control and which also provides a convenient target for boards of 
directors to reach (Joskow et al.,1993).  Return on assets (ROA) is measured as earnings before interest and tax 
divided by end of year total assets (Bhagat and Bolton, 2004) 
3.2 Preliminary Analysis 
We employed Pearson Correlation and moderated regression analyses in the study. Pearson correlation assumes 
the data is linear, and shows the relationship/association between the dependent variable and independent 
variable whereas moderated regression reported the extent of the effect of the independent variables on 
dependent variable. We first analyzed for correlation using coefficient of correlation r for association and 
coefficient of determination R
2
 to establish the extent to which board structure accounted for changes in risk 
taking. Lastly, we employed a moderated regression model to establish the moderated regression coefficient of 
correlation and difference between extents of risk taking created by board structure. The general panel regression 
model we used in the study is as follows:    
……………..…………………………………………………………….(i) 
Where; 
 is risk taking 
 is the constant of equation (represents the changes in risk taking that cannot be explained by independent 
variables in the model) 
is the coefficient of regression for board structure variables 
 is the vector of board structure variables 
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 is error term 
  is ith  order of the regression models  
 is the measure of time 
 
The model testing direct effects of board structure on risk taking is as follows: 
…………………………………………………….(ii) 
Where; 
 is risk taking 
 is the constant of equation (represents the changes in risk taking that cannot be explained by independent 
variables in the model) 
 is the measure of board size 
 is the measure of director independence 
 is the measure of CEO duality 
 is the coefficient regression for X1 
 is the coefficient regression for X2 
 is the coefficient regression for X3 
 is error term 
  is  i
th
  order of the regression models  
 
The model testing moderated regression analysis is as follows: 
....            . (iii) 
 is risk taking 
 is the constant of equation (represents the changes in risk taking that cannot be explained by independent 
variables in the model) 
 is the measure of board size 
 is the measure of director independence 
 is the measure of CEO duality 
 is the coefficient regression for X1 
 is the coefficient regression for X2 
 is the coefficient regression for X3 
 is the measure of Board size*Firm Performance 
is the measure of Director Independence*Firm Performance 
 is the measure of CEO duality*Firm Performance 
  is ith  order of the regression models  
 is the measure of time 
 is error term 
The data collected was classified in a table and presented in graphs to show the relationship of each independent 
variable and the dependent variable (risk taking) 
4.0 Empirical Results 
Descriptive statistics and correlations are reported in Table 1. The Pearson correlation test on the variables 
(independent, dependent and controlling variables) to investigate the relationship between the variables as well 
as multi- co linearity was conducted. The level of correlations among the variables is relatively moderate with 
most of the variables showing significant correlations. The relationship between variables in Table 1 shows that 
board size is significantly negatively correlated to risk taking, director independence is significantly positively 
correlated to risk taking and CEO duality and risk taking had no correlation. 
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Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations 
Variable Mean Std.dev
. 
Risk 
takin
g 
Boar
d 
Size 
CEO 
Dualit
y 
Director 
independen
ce 
Fir
m 
size 
Industr
y 
Firm 
Performan
ce 
Risk  
taking 
24765.0
4 
18918.7
6 
1       
Board  
Size 
8.7 2.98 -
.862*
* 
1      
CEO 
Duality 
.004 .27 -.11 -.09 1     
Director 
independen
ce 
.7695 .15 -
.547*
* 
.318*
* 
-.071 1    
Firm size 5.002 1.8798 .599*
* 
.126 -.015 .219** 1   
Industry 3.101 1.098 .334*
* 
-.129 -
.188** 
.081 .112 1  
Firm 
Performanc
e 
0.9962 9.207 -.04 -.107 .026 .081 .091 .09 1 
N=288;**p<.01 
Hypothesis was tested using moderated regression analysis. Before multiple regressions was performed, the 
variables were standardized to reduce the effect of multicollinarity especially when using interaction variables 
(Bauer and Curran, 2005; Aiken and West, 1991).In testing the hypothesis control variables (Industry and Firm 
size) and main effects were entered and later each interaction variable was entered separately. 
Hypothesis 1 tested whether board size has no effect on firm’s risk-taking in listed companies. However, results 
on Table 2, shows that this hypothesis does not hold (β= -0.179, p<0.05 
Hypothesis 2 proposed that director independence has no effect on risk taking in listed companies. Results from 
Table 2 shows that the hypothesis does not hold (β =0.140, p <0.05).  
Hypothesis 3 postulated that CEO duality has no negative effect on risk-taking in listed companies. The results 
reported does not have to it (β = 0 .215, p >0.05).  
Hypotheses 4a, 4b and 4c focus on moderating role of firm performance in the relationship between board 
structure and firm risk-taking behavior. Hypothesis 4a suggested that firm performance does not moderate the 
relationship between board size and firm risk taking. Table 2 indicated that the interaction between board size 
and firm performance was significant as evident of coefficient of β=0.025, p < 0.05. This may be due to the fact 
that when the firm performance is high, board tends to leave or the decision making process under CEO 
discretion, thus CEO might engage into decision which are more risky.  
Hypothesis 4b predicted that firm performance does not moderate the relationship between board independence 
and firm risk taking. The results showed a coefficient of β =0.131 with p value of 0.019 therefore the hypothesis 
did not get any support. Hence, the study concluded that at higher levels of firm performance, directors’ 
independence increase risk taking in the firm. This may be related to the fact that when performance is high, 
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board assumes continues performance, hence they tend to be less engaged in decision making leading to high 
risks.  
Finally, Hypothesis 4c states that firm performance moderates the relationship between CEO duality and firm 
risk. Analysis in Table 2 reveals that after using firm’s performance to moderate the relationship between CEO 
duality  and the firm risk taking its effect on predicting risk taking was not significant as recorded by coefficient  
(β =0.092 , p > 0.05) therefore the results reject hypothesis 4c.  
Table 2 Regression Analysis Results 
Variable Model 1 
(Direct 
Effects) 
Model 2      
(Firm 
performance*Board 
size) 
Model 3 
(Firm 
performance*Director 
Independence) 
Model 4 
(Firm 
performance*CEO 
Duality) 
Constant .431(.000) .430(.000) .429(.000) .433(.000) 
Control 
variables 
    
Firm size .570(.000) .581(.000) .583(.000) .570(.000) 
Industry .278(.000) .287(.000) .289(.000) .278(.000) 
Predictor 
variables 
    
Board size -.179(.000) -.178(.000) -.158(.02) -.179(.000) 
CEO 
Duality 
.072(.000) .068(.173) .066(.183) .64(.312) 
Director 
independe
nce 
.140(.007) .135(.009) .124(.017) .139(.008) 
Interactio
n 
- .101(.40) .119(.019) .014(.827) 
R
2
 .475 .485 .488 .475 
(F ratio) 39.928** 34.472** 34.903** 33.138** 
 
  5.0 Discussions and Conclusion  
Based on the research findings, we concluded that Board size highly influences risk taking, the more the firm 
increases the number of board members the lower the level of risk taking. We also identified that board 
independence had positive effect on risk taking , in the study number of non-executives board members were 
found to be almost equal with number of board members. We concluded that some reasons for this may be that 
independent directors have relevant experience, and, apart from complying with their legal obligations of due 
care and skill, lack a direct interest in the company’s performance (and the incentive that interest brings), 
consistent with the expectation, the results support that strong firm boards (at least small board size) positively 
relate to firm risk-taking. Consistent with the expectation, we realized that CEO duality had no impact on risk 
taking. Contrary to the prediction increase in performance we also discovered that when boards are large there is 
increased risk taking in the firms this because of the availability of resources and perhaps excitement in the firm 
triggered by previous success. Finally we discovered that firm performance had a role in the relationship 
between director independence and risk taking. However, we reported from the results that firm performance had 
no effect on the relationship between CEO duality and firm risk taking 
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